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Perceptual learning: Insight in sight
Vincent Walsh and Mike Booth
The Hebbian synapse and Hebb learning rule are
familiar to those working on biological and machine
learning. But Hebb’s insights from over fifty years ago
carry many other lessons in learning and may
contribute to a more parsimonious taxonomy of the
mechanisms involved.
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If you look at Figure 1 you will see an array of apparently
random blobs. Now look at the photograph of a face in
Figure 2, on the next page, and then back at Figure 1. You
should find that your perception of the image shown in
Figure 1 has changed — you have experienced abrupt
perceptual learning. But not all perceptual learning is so
fast; consider, for example, learning to view different
structures or cell types in histological sections, or learning
to identify the styles of different artists. Improvement on
these kinds of tasks comes slowly, with experience and
following trial and error. Two different kinds of learning
then, and presumably two different mechanisms to
explain them.
The rapid, insightful change in your perception of Figure
1 is usually attributed to some kind of cognitive function
[1], perhaps located in higher levels of the visual cortex
[2], whereas the slower, perceptual learning is most com-
monly explained in terms of changes in neuronal tuning in
early cortical areas, particularly the primary visual area V1
[3]. The idea that these two forms of learning represent
dichotomous mechanisms has faced a long-standing chal-
lenge from Hebb [4], who argued that insight probably
contributed to all forms of learning, whether rapid or by
slow trial and error, and therefore “if all learning is insight-
ful we can no longer speak of insight as if it were distinct
from other forms of learning”. If Hebb is right, then we
must either be able to explain cognitive learning by a
lower-level mechanism or perceptual learning by some
higher-level mechanism. Two recent, independent
studies [5,6] suggest the answer lies between these two
extremes. 
In a study of gradual perceptual learning [5], subjects were
required to view visual search arrays that were presented
for just a short period of time, and report whether a
pre-specified target was present or absent. The arrays
consisted of up to forty-nine line segments which were
either all in the same orientation — the ‘target absent’ sit-
uation — or all in the same orientation except for one line
— the target — which had a different orientation. The
subjects improved over thousands of trials after which
they could process the array and detect the target much
more quickly. They were then tested on a range of varia-
tions of the original task. The benefits of practice were
found to extend to expanded arrays or mirror images of
original stimuli, though not to contracted arrays or arrays in
which the line orientations are changed.
The responses of neurons in V1 are specific for stimulus
size, orientation and retinal position, so if perceptual
learning is governed by V1 the effects of learning should
not survive transformations of the size, orientation or
location of the visual search arrays. Learning in this case,
then, cannot be accounted for simply by the properties of
V1 neurons, and Ahissar and Hochstein [5] argue that the
transfer effects are due to secondary visual areas “where
specific, top-down controlled computations are performed
on the output of primary visual cortex”. Other studies
have also crossed the boundary between sensory and
cognitive functions, observing that cognitive strategy can
Figure 1
For most viewers this image will present a random array of blobs. But
now look at Figure 2 over the page.
be important in vernier acuity [7] and orientation discrimi-
nation tasks [8].
So, it seems clear from Ahissar and Hochstein’s results [5]
that apparently slow, low-level learning requires higher-
level input, but is the converse true — does rapid, object-
related learning have any of the features of lower-level
learning? Rubin et al. [6] investigated this question by
looking at learning effects in the perception of illusory,
sometimes called ‘cognitive’ or ‘subjective’, contours.
Illusory contours offer an example in which the visual
system appears to go beyond the information given and
thus to construct a percept. Rubin et al. [6] used illusory
squares which could be made ‘fat’ or ‘thin’ by rotating the
angle of the four ‘pacmen’ inducers inwards (thin) or out-
wards (fat) (Fig. 3). They selected these stimuli because,
like the face in Figure 1, subjects perceive them better
when they know what they are looking for.
The original discrimination task was difficult and subjects
showed no signs of improvement with practice when the
stimuli were made with low curvature inducers — small
differences between ‘thin’ and ‘fat’ illusory shapes (see
Fig. 3). If the subjects were shown a few examples of easy
discriminations mixed in with the difficult ones, however,
their performance improved suddenly and dramatically.
This rapid, insightful learning was expressed as an
improved ability to discriminate the fatness/thinness of
the stimuli, and also as a decrease in the time taken to
make the discrimination. So far the experiment had not
posed a threat to a cognitive explanation of abrupt learn-
ing, but Rubin et al. [6] then gave their subjects the same
task but simply increased the distance between the sub-
jects and the computer screen. Surprisingly, performance
did not transfer to the new retinal image size — hardly a
factor which should affect a cognitive strategy. Again,
however, presentation of a few easy discriminations led to
rapid relearning of the task. 
Just as with the slow perceptual learning, then, insightful
learning presents a mixture of low-level and high-level
processing, but the link between the two types of learning
is still not proven. If there were a single mechanism
underlying gradual and abrupt learning, it should be possi-
ble to demonstrate both modes of improvement using
only one task. Rubin et al. [6] did exactly this and found
not only that they could produce both types of learning
simply by manipulating the length of time available to
view the stimuli, but also that they could produce a con-
tinuum of learning from gradual to sudden, and in all cases
the learning was size specific. Following this, it would
take much special pleading to rescue the idea of two sepa-
rate learning mechanisms. A strong test of this aspect of
Rubin et al.’s argument would be to examine the activity
of neurons in different regions of cortex using different
stimulus exposure times — the discovery of one neuron
displaying both fast and abrupt learning with the same
stimulus would be an important step in establishing the
unity of rapid and slow learning processes.
These experiments form part of an emerging theme in
studies of visual cortex function. It is becoming increas-
ingly necessary to look to interactive rather than hierarchi-
cal models of visual processing. Visual area V1, for
example, contains some cells that respond to illusory con-
tours [9], others that compute aspects of surface colour
[10] and even some cells that show attentional modulation
[11] — all functions previously thought to be in the ‘cogni-
tive’ domain. Insightful learning may now be added to the
list of cognitive functions that may be investigated in the
sensory cortex, and the role of insight in learning can be
added to the list of Hebbian foresights. It was Hebb after-
all who, nearly half a century ago [4], said of insight, “Per-
ceiving, at whatever level, is probably never free of its
influence; and there is no complex psychological event
which is not a function of it”.
One might wonder what Hebb meant by insight. His
classic book covers many kinds of learning and plasticity:
infants learning to see, adults and non-human animals
solving perceptual or cognitive problems, and patients
recovering from brain injury, to name but a few. Did his
use of insight mean the same in all these contexts? A hint
of Hebb’s intention comes from his 1949 classic [4], in
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Figure 2
The original picture from which Figure 1 was produced. Look at the face
in this photograph and now turn back to Figure 1. Most readers will now
find it very easy to perceive the face in the greyscale ‘blob’ image.
which he offers one definition of insight as “the operation
of (intelligence) in the particular instance”. Clearly he
intended the concept to address as wide a range of learn-
ing as possible.
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Figure 3
Examples of the discriminanda used by Rubin et al. [6]. The two stimuli
at the top are examples of difficult ‘fat’ and ‘thin’ squares. Subjects
initially found these kinds of stimuli difficult to discriminate correctly.
The two stimuli at the bottom are easy to recognize examples of ‘fat’
and ‘thin’ illusory figures. Subjects learned very quickly to make
judgements on the harder stimuli if they were presented with only two
or three examples of the easier ones.
Easy discrimination
Difficult discrimination
